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Abstract 
This paper examines to what extent Temporary Help Agency intermediation in the 
labour market affects workers' transitions into and out of employment in the Spanish 
youth labour market throughout the nineties. Results obtained show that this 
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1 Introduction
Temporary Help Agencies (THAs, for short) offer employment contracts of
a limited duration to jobseekers and assign them to client firms wishing to
hire them to perform jobs of a temporary nature. In Spain, those labor
market intermediaries were allowed to operate for the first time under regu-
lation provided for by the 1994 labour market reform. From then on, THA
contracting has become a growing area, actually accounting for almost 16%
of the total number of temporary contracts (see Table 1). Given that this
proportion has almost multiplied by three between 1995 and 1999, an em-
pirical assessment of how successful these agencies are in assigning workers
to jobs could have important policy implications.
Although attempts to analyze this form of labor contracting are by no
means lacking, a recurring trend in the literature is to consider that the ex-
istence of these agencies exacerbates the inherent insecurities of the labour
market.1 Nonetheless, up to our knowledge, there are still no empirical
findings on the determinants of job transition patterns among THA work-
ers in Spain. For instance, do workers who use a THA have longer spells
of unemployment than their counterparts who contact employers directly?
Similarly, on what basis might it be asserted that THA workers only receive
brief assignments in client firms interspersed with relatively long periods of
unemployment? In this paper, we will give an answer to these questions for
the Spanish labour market, therefore offering an analysis of the effectiveness
of this specific job search method.
In particular, we investigate the determinants of employment and unem-
ployment hazard rates of a sample of over 19,000 individuals affiliated to the
Social Security system. This sample consists of the labour history from 1990
to 1999 of workers who were, by the end of 1995, either employed through a
Temporary Help Agency (THA) or non-employed at that time2. Our data
set is only representative of young workers in the Spanish labour market. If
we compare the structure of the labour force survey throughout the nineties
to our data set, workers under 30 years-old account for 47% among those
under 50 years-old in the former, whereas in our sample this figure is 49%.
Hence, we can confirm that we have only a representative sample for workers
1Common criticisms are that (1) not only are THA workers paid less than core workers
for working at similar types of jobs, but also that their chances of obtaining employee
benefits are less than those for traditional core workers (Emerson, 1988; Moberly, 1987);
(2) that such a situation may create uncertainty and greater economic risk for these
workers (Blank, 1998); and (3) that extensive reliance on THA workers may create two
classes of employees: permanent workers with relatively secure, high—paying employment
and THA workers (along with temporary workers in general) who have only sporadic,
low—paid work (Mangum et al., 1985).
2This means that all workers were working through a THA or were unemployed at
the moment of the sample selection. Nevertheless, as the data set includes the complete
labour history of those two groups along the nineties, we have, as is shown in Table 3,
THA and non-THA employment spells.
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under 52 years-old.3 Thus, our analysis is focused on providing information
on mobility rates for young individuals along the nineties, placing a spe-
cial focus on the development of THA workers relative to no-THA ones.4
Young individuals constitute a group of much concern for policy in Spain,
given that, according to the Spanish Labour Force Survey, 59.19% of the
unemployed and 80.81% of temporary contracts belonged to workers under
40 years-old in this period.
We will use duration models applied to a longitudinal data set on in-
dividuals’ work history by taking into account the effects of both duration
and individual heterogeneity in the hazard rates. Our estimation technique
allows us to take account of concurrent events via time—dependent vari-
ables, similar to the ones used in Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002) and
García—Pérez (1997). The use of Social Security records presents impor-
tant advantages for the analysis of turnover with respect to other sources
of information.5 Firstly, it collects information on all jobs held during a
quite long period. Secondly, it allows us to determine employment and non—
employment durations precisely because of its detailed duration information.
Different statistical sources have also been used to study the determinants
of employment transitions; in particular, we can mention the use of the En-
cuesta de Condiciones de Vida y Trabajo by Alba—Ramirez (1991), Andrés
et al. (1989), Sánchez Moreno and Peraita (1996) or García—Serrano and
Malo (1996), and the use of the Spanish Labour Force Survey by Toharia
(1997), Bover et al. (2002), Güell (2002) and Güell and Petrongolo (2000).
Apart from the effect of Temporary Help Agencies, a second motivation
for this article is to analyze the impact of the two main labour market re-
forms undertaken in Spain throughout the nineties.6 The 1994 reform put
forward specific limits on the use of fixed—term contracts: the minimum and
maximum duration of temporary contracts for young people were changed
to 6 months and 2 years, respectively.7 It also extended the subsidies and
incentives to promote the conversion of fixed—term contracts into permanent
ones, which were introduced in 1992. The 1997 reform implemented again
new measures that attempted to rectify the excessive precariousness present
after 1984: more subsidies to promote the transition from temporary to
3However, workers between 20 and 29 years old and those between 35 and 39 years old
are pretty overrepresented in our database.
4These agencies mainly hire young workers (83.6% of the labour contracts signed by
THAs are with workers under 35 years-old).
5A different extraction from Social Security records was previously used to study em-
ployment and unemployment spells through the use of duration models in García—Fontes
and Hopenhayn (1996) and García—Pérez (1997), but they only have data up to the year
1993.
6See, for example, Güell and Petrongolo (2000) or Segura(2001) for a deep description
of these reforms.
7Nevertheless, the use of even shorter contracts was quite frequent under the type of
contract named as “por obra y servicio”.
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permanent contracts were agreed upon and a new typology of permanent
contract with lower firing costs targeted at “protected categories” of workers
–young people under 30 years—old, long—term unemployed, people above 45
years—old and disabled individuals– was introduced. Given this new insti-
tutional context, we consider the analysis of both inflows and outflows from
employment in this decade essential in the assessment of mobility patterns.
Our results indicate that although job tenure through THAs is lower than
without these intermediaries, the main advantage offered by those agencies
is that their workers’ unemployment spells are shorter than for no-THA
workers (although only for short-term unemployed individuals). Therefore,
working as a THA worker implies a trade-off for the individual. We also
find that the exit rates from both employment and unemployment are very
high in the time period analyzed. This leads us to the conclusion that
there has been a high level of turnover in the Spanish youth labour market
throughout the 90’s. Indeed, the use of fixed-term labour contracts is not
only widespread, but, in addition is becoming a structural characteristic of
the labour market given that very few of these contracts are renewed as
permanent ones (see Dolado et al., 2002). This fact offers an explanation
for the observed persistence of turnover rates, especially for very young,
low qualified individuals and during recession periods. These findings are
likely to be the reasons why the exit rate from employment presents a very
important peak exactly at the thirty-sixth month, the maximum duration of
a fixed-term contract in Spain. We have also obtained evidence supporting
the argument that the 1997 labour market reform slightly reduced this high
turnover rate observed in the central years of this decade.
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we briefly summarize the fac-
tors underlying the duration of both employment and unemployment spells.
Secondly, we show the econometric models for duration analysis that we use
in our estimations. We then describe the data in detail and subsequently
present the empirical results. The last section offers our conclusions.
2 Framework of analysis
2.1 The duration of unemployment spells
The theoretical analysis of unemployment duration is based on job search
models (see extensive surveys in Mortensen, 1986 or Devine and Kiefer,
1991). The basic outcome of these models is the unemployment hazard
rate. This hazard rate is the product of the probability α(t) of receiving
a job offer and the probability that the non—working individual will accept
the offer. The latter is the probability that the arriving wage offer is higher
than a critical value, called the reservation wage, wR(t).
The job offer probability, α(t), is a function of both the level of demand
and the search activity of job seekers. In this sense, an individual’s level of
3
qualification can be expected to have a positive effect on α(t); a negative
impact of age is expected as well. As regards the intensity of search, it is
evident that it must have a positive impact on α(t). Finally, employment
demand conditions –measured either through the unemployment rate or
through the number of vacancies– may be having some influence on α(t)
in the sense that the better those conditions are, the higher the expected
job offer probability. Apart from these main effects, we can expect this offer
arrival rate to vary with the duration of the unemployment spell because
of human capital depreciation or stigma effects appearing as unemployment
lengthens.8 THA intermediation can be thought of as a tool to increase
search intensity and search effectiveness. However, as time passes, working
through a THA may be considered as a bad signal for unemployed workers.
The other component of the unemployment hazard rate is the acceptance
probability which is equal to the probability that the offered wage is equal or
higher than the reservation wage. Therefore, any variable which increases (or
reduces) the reservation wage will reduce (or increase) the job acceptance
probability and, in addition, will reduce (or increase) the probability of
exiting from unemployment, given all other things equal.
Finally, as well as the arrival rate, and in part because of it, the reser-
vation wage is also a negative function of unemployment duration. For in-
stance, the amount of unemployment benefits received is not constant along
time, but is usually decreasing with time. All these factors make the ac-
ceptance probability to increase with unemployment duration and, hence,
no clear prediction arises for the effect of unemployment duration on the
unemployment hazard rate. However, available empirical evidence indicates
that, in general, the net effect is negative9 or positive at the beginning of
the spell and decreasing afterwards (See García-Pérez, 1997, 2001).
2.2 The duration of employment spells
The duration of employment spells has usually been analyzed using the
models of efficient labour turnover developed by Jovanovic (1979a,b). These
are incomplete information models in which (i) workers’ abilities are not fully
known at hiring; (ii) the employer would like to produce at a desired level
but deviation from this level is acceptable so long as it does not fall below
a minimum threshold; and (iii) the firm monitors workers until sufficient
information is collected in order to make a judgement with the acceptable
degree of accuracy. In this context of incomplete information, the actual
contract goes on as long as the individual’s expected productivity keeps
above a threshold firing level (called the reservation productivity). Thus,
the hazard rate out of employment is equal to the probability that this
expected productivity falls below the reservation productivity.
8See, for instance, Vishwanath (1989) or Pissarides (1992).
9See Narendranatham et al. (1985), and Nickell (1979).
4
Jovanovic’s model was designed for homogeneous workers. However,
when estimating the hazard rate from employment, we must take into ac-
count the observed differences among workers. Those differences may be
due to both individual or job position characteristics. For example, work-
ers with the most valued features for the firm will have longer employment
spells. Secondly, a higher qualification can be associated to longer tenure
in the firm if employers consider that workers complying with higher quali-
fication levels are more flexible and have a higher ability of adaptation. In
addition, the reservation productivity defined for the worker—firm matching
may also depend on the economic cycle and on local labour market condi-
tions.
Once we have taken into account the fact that different individuals have
different probabilities of exiting from employment (i.e., the heterogeneity ef-
fect), we must also consider the possibility that these probabilities depend
on the actual length of the employment spell (i.e., the duration effect). Ac-
cording to Jovanovic’s model (1979b) the likelihood of job ending is expected
to be shorter the longer the duration of the spell; the reason being that those
individuals who are “good matches” dedicate less time to find alternative
offers and are less likely to accept any such potential offer. In addition, we
would also expect that, the longer the spell, the more important the invest-
ments in specific human capital will be, and the greater the specificity of
this investment, so that the employment hazard rate diminishes. Another
important factor is that the longer the employment spell, the higher the
firing costs. Hence the firm will have less incentives to get rid of the worker.
3 Duration analysis: econometric proceedings
In order to study the hazard rate for both employment and unemploy-
ment spells, a discrete-time duration model will be used. The estimation
technique is similar to that in the works of Narendranathan and Stewart
(1993), Sueyoshi (1995), Jenkins (1995), García—Pérez (1997) and Bover et
al. (2002). The reason for using discrete—time techniques is not only that
data are observed in discrete intervals (namely, in months) but also that
these techniques are much more flexible for estimating the time—dependence
of the hazard rate (see Meyer, 1990).
Moreover, the technique used in this paper helps us to circumvent the
usual assumption of proportionality between the effects of duration and
other covariates over the hazard rate. There are cases in which the impact
of explanatory variables changes with duration in a determined state; for
instance, the effect of being a THA-worker over the exit rate from unemploy-
ment may not be the same for short and for long-term unemployed. Because
of this, it is necessary to model the hazard rate in a non-proportional way
and, for this purpose, discrete time helps considerably.
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Therefore, our hazard rate is a conditional probability whose dependence
on duration and other explanatory variables can be considered through a
known distribution function. As in other papers, for example García-Pérez
(1997) or Bover et al. (2002), we will use the logistic distribution. Hence,
considering the duration in employment and unemployment states as our
discrete random variables, and taking also into account the effect of personal
characteristics, our two conditional exit rates will be as follows:
θ(t) = F (θ0(t) + θ1(t)x(t)) (1)
where x(t) is a vector of personal characteristics –one of which is whether
the individual is working throughout a THA or not10– and of aggregated
characteristics which do vary over time t; θ0(t) is the additive term of the
duration-dependence in the hazard rates that we will estimate in the most
general way; and θ1(t) represents the coefficients for the explanatory vari-
ables which in general depend on duration –that is, interactions between
these variables and duration are allowed for.
Due to the absence in our data set of important determinants of both
hazards –e.g., family income, characteristics of the job and whether or not
the individual is receiving unemployment benefits– and, given the known
result of unobserved heterogeneity generating spurious duration-dependence
in the hazard rate (see, for example, Flinn & Heckman, 1982), it is necessary
to control for this problem. Hence, in the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity, our hazard rates will have the following form:
θ(t, η) = F (θ0(t) + θ1(t)x(t) + η) (2)
We do not wish to impose more structure upon our estimation. Thus, we
will follow a semi-parametric approach based on Heckman and Singer (1984)
where we are assuming that unobserved heterogeneity follows a discrete
distribution function with different mass points. In particular, our results
are based on a two—mass—point distribution function.11
The estimation technique of the model is maximum likelihood. Given
the likelihood contribution of each individual i in the sample, Li(η), 12 con-
ditional on η, we obtain that with unobserved heterogeneity, η, the log-
likelihood function takes the form:
ln£h =
NX
i=1
ln
Z
Li(η)dF (η) (3)
10We know from García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2001) that this binary variable could
be affected by the self-selection of workers into THAs. This bias can be taken into account
by jointly estimating a process for this variable (see García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2003)
11 In addition, an alternative estimation with three different mass points was undertaken;
however, one of them always converges to zero. Therefore, we can properly account with
two mass points for the unobserved heterogeneity in our data.
12 See García-Pérez (1997) for an expression of this likelihood function.
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where F (η) is the cumulative distribution function of η, which is a discrete
function with two mass points, η1 and η2. These mass points are selected
in order to verify the assumption of E(η) = 0 which is necessary given the
presence of a constant term in the hazard rates. Besides, it is estimated the
probability p for the variable η to be equal to its value η1.
4 Data
The data we use are based on work histories of a sample of 19,778 individuals
collected from administrative data belonging to Social Security records. It
includes information on all individuals’ employment (and non-employment)
spells from 1990 to 1999 of a sample of mainly young workers. The fact
that some employed workers were hired through THAs provides us with a
comparative advantage for casting new light on the development of those
intermediaries in the labour market.
The work history data provided includes information about worker age
and gender, professional category of the worker contribution to the Social
Security13, dates at which employment spells start and end, type of So-
cial Security system for the worker, the reasons for the termination of the
spell (voluntary quit, dismissal or retirement), the Spanish province where
the employment spell took place, an identifier of whether each employment
spell is accomplished through a THA or not, another one if it is accom-
plished through a public firm, and, finally, the type of contract held by
the worker (temporary or permanent). We eliminate incomplete records,
and also spells of individuals above 52 years-old in order to avoid the bias
that early retirement programs may create in both exit rates, and keep only
workers affiliated to the General System (Régimen General) so as to avoid
the bias in the estimations that special systems like Agriculture, Fisheries,
and so on would provoke. In addition, given we are not studying job-to-
job movements, in order to achieve greater homogeneity, we also eliminate
records destroyed for reasons other than dismissals or end of contracts.14
Finally, given that we want to use information about the following employer
13We must underscore that the eleven professional categories of worker contribution to
Social Security in the database do not reveal the workers’ level of qualification, but rather
the required level of qualification for the job. For instance, an individual working in the
lowest category, “peón”, may well be in possession of an academic degree. In any case, we
will refer to contribution categories from here onwards as “qualification”, although this
remark should be taken into account. As in previous studies using data from the Social
Security records, we group those eleven categories into four groups.
14 In this database we cannot distinguish between these two different reasons for ter-
mination of the spell and, therefore, we consider both of them as involuntary turnover.
Moreover, we will not consider voluntary turnover. As voluntary and involuntary reasons
for job ending are completely different, we consider that they have to be studied sepa-
rately. Future research will compare the results in this paper to the results arising from
an analysis of the subsample of quits.
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in each employment or unemployment spells, we keep only individuals with
at least two observed employment spells.15
Our database contains an important number of individuals presenting
subsequent employment spells through the same firm, with particularly short
unemployment spells in-between these jobs. Evidence for this is shown in
Table 2. This table shows average employment and unemployment durations
for individuals who present no subsequent spells through the same firm, and
for individuals who, on the contrary, have from two to twelve consecutive
spells through the same employer along their work history. As can be ob-
served, job duration quickly reduce as the number of spells through the same
employer increases. Something similar occurs for unemployment spells: the
more likely the individual is to be employed through the same employer, the
shorter the intermediate unemployment spells he must confront with. This
behaviour is even more pronounced when we distinguish between THA and
no-THA workers. This fact highlights the main characteristic of those in-
termediaries: they are used for very short employment spells but they seem
to optimize the time the worker is unemployed. Moreover, these figures are
also reflecting the new hiring policies adopted by firms which consist of us-
ing very short temporary contracts intensively in order to avoid uncertainty
and, in addition, to reduce labour costs.
Given the turnover observed in our data –with mainly short unem-
ployment spells– and in order to avoid estimating transitions between two
different employment spells without passing through a real state of unem-
ployment, we decided to use neither unemployment nor employment expe-
riences shorter than 15 days.16 The basic change these spells provoke over
the employment hazard rate is that the latter is much higher at one-month
duration. Apart from this, estimations implemented with these spells show
no special differences compared to the ones presented here. The only re-
markable change is that the THA effect over the hazard rate becomes even
stronger, given that many short—term jobs are implemented through these
firms.
As regards employment spells, our sample consists of 49,322 spells,17
whose characteristics can be observed in Table 3. Our sample of estimation
is composed mainly of relatively young males, with a reduced qualification
level, and with very short durations in employment (indeed, more than half
of the observations in our database present durations of less than 3 months).
15Given that the data set is mainly constituted by young workers, the percentage of
individuals who do not hold at least two employment spells is insignificant. That is, when
we keep individuals for whom only a single spell of employment is observed, the final
sample is very similar to the one finally used in the analysis. Statistics are available from
the authors upon request.
16 It is likely than this very short unemployment spells are representing just a delay in
registering the worker at the Administration after a job—to—job movement.
17This is a sub—sample of the initial sample (of 180,010 records). It was necessary to
take this random sample due to the techniques of estimation implemented.
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Given that there is a very small number of observations for long durations
(>46 months) and in order to avoid noise in the results, we have consid-
ered these observations as artificially right-censored, that is, as employment
spells that do not finish in the observed period. This is the reason why
there are no observations with employment durations beyond 46 months.
In addition, there are individuals who keep on as employed at the moment
where data were downloaded (December 1999); these observations are also
right—censored, because their spells are not complete at that moment. How-
ever, most of jobs (95.75%) terminate during the sample period. As opposed
to the sub-sample of non—THA individuals, workers who find employment
through these intermediaries are more likely to be younger, women and to
be in possession of a reduced qualification level. In addition, THA workers
enjoy shorter employment durations than non—THA individuals (the average
tenure is 3.65 months, as opposed to 6.09 months for non—THA workers).
On the other hand, we have a sample of 34,137 unemployment spells.
Their main characteristics are shown in Table 4. For the same reason as
in the employment analysis, we consider unemployment durations beyond
30 months and the ones that have not finished before December 1999 as
right-censored unemployment experiences. Again, in this sample of unem-
ployment records, men are the majority; most of observations show low
qualification levels; young individuals (under 25 years—old) represent almost
half of the total sample size, and only 15.42 percent of complete unem-
ployment experiences go on beyond 6 months. As regards THA individuals
when compared to non—THA ones, we find that agency workers are more
likely to be younger, to be in possession of reduced qualification levels and
to have shorter unemployment spells (the average stay in unemployment is
2.81 months for agency workers, but 4.29 months for non—THA individuals).
Given the estimation technique used, which consists of breaking down
the event into monthly observations in which the individual is at risk of
failure in employment or unemployment (see Jenkins, 1995), the final length
of the database on employment and unemployment is of 311,156 and 146,071
registers, respectively.
5 Estimation results
The specification of the hazard rates will be the following. Apart from
the variables on individual and job characteristics, the business cycle and
local economic conditions (which collect the observed heterogeneity effect),
duration-dependence has been taken into account through the inclusion of a
polynomial in log(t). In addition, dummy variables indicating whether or not
the individual is on—the—job in his sixth, twelfth, eighteenth, twenty—fourth,
thirtieth or thirty—sixth month have been included in the employment hazard
rate. We do this because, as explained below, evidence indicates that the
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likelihood of exiting from employment is significantly higher in these months.
Finally, interactions between duration (in employment or unemployment)
and some of the explanatory variables have also been specified18.
5.1 Hazard rate from employment
Let us first examine the effect of employment duration on the likelihood of
exiting from the job. Monthly Kaplan—Meier estimates for the total sample
are plotted in Figure 1. This empirical hazard function collects the pro-
portion of individuals leaving employment at each moment in time, given
that they have been employed until that moment (Lancaster, 1990). As
can be observed, this hazard rate is declining with employment duration,
so that the probability of job ending declines with tenure on the job. The
exit rate is very high early in the job, reaching 32.62% in the first month;
it falls to 5.61% at the end of the first year, and then remains at around
3% from then on. However, the most interesting result in Figure 1 is the
fact that the hazard rate actually rises to peaks in months 6 (32.34%), 12
(19.07%), 18 (12.27%), 24 (16.70%), 30 (12.46%) and 36 (32.47%). These
peaks show that job contracts are very likely to finish at each of these par-
ticular months. This fact can be basically explained by the extensive use of
fixed-term contracts which are usually signed for these specific durations.
In Table 5, we present the results of the maximum likelihood estimation
of the hazard rate out of employment assuming a logistic distribution for F
(equation 2), under the two assumptions of no unobserved heterogeneity and
a two—mass—point distribution function for this heterogeneity. As expected
from the shape of the empirical hazard rate previously presented, tenure on
the job presents a negative impact on the exit rate. Moreover, the dummies
describing employment durations which are multiples of six (i.e., durations of
6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months) present a positive and very significant effect
on the hazard rate. Since in this database it is not possible to distinguish
as a reason for termination of the spell, between the end of a temporary
contract and a dismissal, and, given that no special reason can be adduced
to explain why individuals should be dismissed at those months multiple of
six, we can then deduce that the positive effect of these dummy variables
must be very likely due to temporary contract terminations. These effects
can be qualified by taking into account these dummies’ interactions with
some of the factors collecting the heterogeneity effect. Hence, for instance,
we obtain that higher rates of economic growth reduce the likelihood of
exiting from employment at those peak months, presumably reflecting that
better economic conditions encourage the signing of permanent instead of
temporary contracts. Moreover, younger individuals and those not working
18The final specification of the estimated models only presents the interactions that are
obtained to be significant. Moreover, the shown polynomials in log(t) are the ones which
offer the best results in terms of significance and likelihood values.
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in public firms are the most likely to suffer from contract termination at
those months.
With respect to our main interest, individuals working as agency temps
are more likely to experiment shorter employment spells than individuals
hired directly. This THA effect is plotted in Figure 2, where it can be
noted that THA workers also show stronger peak-month effects. These re-
sults are sensible if we take into account both the demand and supply—side
motivations for addressing to THAs (See Muñoz—Bullón, 2002). From the
demand—side, those intermediaries are often used as a “buffer” for client
firms in order to meet changes in product demand in a context where firms
are reluctant to hire permanent staff until the economic outlook becomes
more stable. From the supply—side, workers addressing to THAs often ap-
preciate the limited work hours or the greater flexibility in scheduling that
can typically be found in these firms. Therefore, THA workers are expected
to show shorter durations in employment (see Table 3).
Table 6 shows the predicted average durations in employment for dif-
ferent groups of individuals distinguishing between their age, sex and qual-
ification level. The whole sample’s predicted employment duration is 6.35
months, and this predicted duration is much larger for no-THA workers.
However, we find that both male and female skilled workers under 25 years-
old present larger expected employment durations under THAs. Hence,
THAs seem to be doing a good job with those very young skilled workers.
Higher employment hazard rates are found when the employer in the
following employment spell is the same as the present one (so-called equal
employer). One of the reasons why individuals who are contracted by the
same employer are more likely to enter into unemployment might be due to
the hiring policy adopted by firms; the latter may resort to former employees
in order to fill vacancies. Thus, employers may be temporarily firing workers
–with whom they have no permanent commitments– during periods of
low demand or in order to avoid having to pay fringe benefits (such as, for
instance, holiday pay); then, once two weeks have passed after the firing
decision, those same former workers are then actually rehired. Finally, a
positive impact on the hazard is also obtained when the individual has been
employed through a public firm, although the impact is lower as experience
in the job lengthens.
With respect to the effects of worker’s characteristics on the probability
of leaving employment, at the beginning of the employment spell, men are
less likely to exit from employment than their female counterparts, although
this differential gender impact is reversed the longer the duration of the spell.
The employment hazard rate is higher for young workers (people under
26 years—old). They also show substantially higher exit rates especially at
peak-months. This result presumably indicates lower firm costs when laying
off these workers, given the temporary nature of many of the contracts that
they hold. Finally, as expected, very low levels of qualification substantially
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increase the probability of exiting from employment.
The effect of economic conditions is measured by the combined impact
of the local unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate. The employment
hazard rate is counter-cyclical only for short employment spells, those under
5 months. This result makes sense, since, when things are getting worse,
firms are dismissing workers whose on—the—job experience is shorter.
Finally, we have included two additional dummies in our estimation to
allow for the specific impact of three distinctive periods throughout the
nineties (Table 5). In order to capture the potential effect of the two labour
market reforms in this decade, we make distinctions between the spells ob-
served before 1995, then those between 1995 and 1996 –that is, under the
effect of the 1994 reform– and, finally, those spells from 1997 onwards –
which may show a different behavior on the hazard rate as a result of the
1997 labour market reform. Net of the business cycle effect, we find that
both periods show higher employment hazard rates than those at the be-
ginning of the nineties. However, the effect changes with tenure and with
the impact of individual variables. As regards tenure, for both the period
from 1995-1996 and the period after 1997, this positive effect is reduced the
longer the tenure. Hazard rates in both periods are also reduced the higher
the GDP growth rates are. As regards the impact of individual variables,
the high employment hazard rates obtained for the period 1995-96 are even
larger for the low-qualified youngest individuals (under 36 years-old) and for
those working through a public firm. As for the specific effect of the period
1997-onwards, the hazard is specially higher for low qualified individuals
and those above 36 years-old. This effect may well show the reduction of
turnover for young people after the 1997 labour market reform. In Table 6
we observe that the average employment durations predicted by our estima-
tion are much lower after the 1994 labour market reform, but they slightly
recovered after the 1997 one. In fact all age groups of skilled males and very
young skilled women benefited from this labour market reform.
The last two columns of Table 5 show the estimation of the employment
hazard rate but controlling for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. We
obtain no evidence in favor of this being present in our data. Although the
likelihood function is a bit higher when controlling for unobserved hetero-
geneity, we estimate almost one point in its distribution function (its value
is non-significant and has a probability of 0.9925). Hence, we conclude that
the employment hazard rate is accurately estimated without taking into
account the control for unobserved heterogeneity.
5.2 Hazard rate from unemployment
Empirical hazard rates from unemployment are shown in Figure 3. As pre-
viously outlined, the maximum duration is 30 months due to the scarcity of
observations beyond this duration. The hazard rate is initially at a rather
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high level at the beginning of the unemployment experience, reaching levels
above 35 percent in the second month.19 However, it falls very quickly until
the eighth month, then shows another peak at the tenth month, and, from
then on, remains at levels slightly above 5 percent.
Table 7 collects the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the
unemployment hazard rate assuming a logistic distribution for F (equation
2). As before, the additive term of the hazard rate collects a fourth—grade
polynomial which replicates quite well the form of the empirical hazard rates.
As regards the effect of individual job position on the probability of leav-
ing unemployment, having worked through a THA in the last employment
experience represents a positive impact on the hazard rate, although the
impact is attenuated as unemployment lengthens (see Table 4). Why do
previous employment experiences through THAs represent an opportunity
for quickly leaving unemployment? There are at least two explanations for
this result. Firstly, it could be that these intermediaries provide workers
with a better connection to the labour force and, thus, greater access to
information. Secondly, positions covered by client firms through THAs are
typically “assessment positions” in which performance –which is visible to
a number of higher—level persons in the organization– largely determines
future career mobility; therefore, these observations and skill development
characteristics of the THA positions increase the probability that capable
people will be engaged in permanent positions20. It makes sense then that
those individuals who stay unemployed for longer after a THA employment
experience become less attractive for potential employers (the former may
be emitting a negative signal for the latter). These effects are reflected in
Figure 4 where we find that the positive impact of having worked through a
THA is only present for those unemployed for less than four months. More-
over, we may wonder whether or not this THA effect is also present at the
destination state or not. That is, exiting from unemployment into a new
THA spell or into a direct contract with an employer may imply two clearly
different situations. We have estimated also a competing risk model for these
two alternative exits from unemployment. Results indicate that for previous
THA workers, the exit into a new THA job is much quicker, especially if the
unemployment spell between the two jobs considered is short enough.21
With respect to worker characteristics, Table 7 shows that males exit
sooner from unemployment than females, although this gender effect is at-
tenuated as length in unemployment increases. As regards qualification, it
19The smaller hazard rate at one month is simply a consequence of obviating unemploy-
ment spells shorter than 14 days.
20As Muñoz—Bullón (2002) indicates, hiring THA workers to monitor them and then to
offer permanent positions only to those who perform well seems to be a common strategy
of employers.
21The results of this competing risk models are not presented in the paper for saving
space. They are available from the authors upon request.
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is the individuals in the lowest group who are the least likely to exit from
unemployment, while the ones in the Medium-Low group are the most likely,
followed by the highest qualified workers. Finally, workers in the medium age
range (from 26 to 35 years—old) enjoy the shortest expected unemployment
durations, though at a decreasing rate.
In Table 8 we present the predicted unemployment durations deduced
from our estimations. Mean unemployment duration is 3.08 months; THA
workers enjoy slightly shorter unemployment durations. However, skilled
workers who were previously working through THAs suffer longer unem-
ployment spells than no-THA ones. Hence, although they are more time
on-the-job (Table 6), once they are unemployed, if they do not exit quickly
from this state, they tend to stay longer in unemployment (therefore, they
may be sending a negative signal for potential employers).
Experience in the previous employment positively affects the probabil-
ity of exiting from unemployment, though at a decreasing rate. This result
indicates that longer previous labour experiences raises the probability of
receiving a job offer, especially at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
Finally, if the firm that hires the unemployed worker is the same as in the
previous job, equal employer, the probability of exiting from unemployment
is much greater. This “recall” phenomenon previously described is common
in the labour market transitions reflected in our empirical analysis. In ad-
dition, those individuals who have been previously employed by a public
firm are more likely to stay for longer in unemployment. As regards the
effect of economic conditions, the unemployment hazard rate is clearly pro-
cyclical: higher levels of national economic activity show a positive effect on
the likelihood of exiting from unemployment.
Finally, we have included two dummies in our unemployment estimation
to allow for the specific impact of three different periods during the nineties:
1990-94, 1995-96, 1997-99. Net of the business cycle effect, the impact of
the two labour market reforms is positive. However, the effect changes
when we take into consideration unemployment duration and the impact of
individual variables. The differential impact of the period 1995-96 increases
the longer the unemployment spell is; a contrary impact of unemployment
duration is obtained for the period 1997-99. The complete effect of these
two dummies can be better understood in Figure 5 where it is shown that
the probability of leaving from unemployment attains its maximum after
1997 only for those who stayed unemployed for less than 3 months. The
effect of the GDP growth rate is not so pro-cyclical in the periods 1995-96
and 1997-onwards. As regards the impact of individual variables, the effects
of those two periods are also attenuated for individuals in the Medium-Low
qualification group; on the contrary, the impact is larger for the youngest
(under 25 years-old). As for specific effects, we find that the impact of the
1995-96 period is lower for individuals who have been previously employed
for longer and if they have been working through a THA. As regards the
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1997-99 period, the effect is increased for men and is reduced if they work
with the same employer.
From Table 8 we find that average unemployment duration clearly re-
duced after the 1994 reform, specially for very young skilled workers. After
the 1997 reform, the average unemployment duration reduced even more
but only for specific workers groups.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity calls for an adequate control,
especially due to the absence of important determinants of the unemploy-
ment hazard rate: apart from information about the household and the
labour market in which the unemployed worker is searching, the receipt
of unemployment benefits is another important variable missing from our
data.22 For this purpose, we have assumed that unobserved heterogeneity
can be summarized by a discrete two—mass—point distribution function. Re-
sults from this estimation are shown in the last two columns of Table 7. The
estimated distribution function shows the existence of two different types of
workers: with 22.56 percent probability, there exists a group of workers with
a much higher unemployment hazard rate. These two estimated types, in
terms of hazard rates, are shown in Figure 6. Even though it is not possible
to identify which specific characteristics lead to this result, unemployment
benefits are likely to represent an important determinant.23 The effects of
unobserved heterogeneity over the remainder estimated parameters are not
very relevant since the estimated coefficients remain very similar. The only
remarkable difference is that under the control of unobserved heterogeneity
as it is usually predicted (see Lancaster, 1990), the duration-dependence of
the unemployment hazard rate is less negative.
6 Conclusion
The present paper has provided a basis for assessing to what extent workers
hired temporarily by a THA exhibit different job transition patterns from
those who, in contrast, have not been hired by those intermediaries. For
this purpose, we have set out the empirical results for the determinants of
employment and unemployment exit rates compiled from a representative
22 In spite of lacking information on this variable, since the proportion of young workers
in the database is very high, these individuals are less likely to be entitled to unemployment
benefits, given their shorter accumulated tenure.
23We have tried to control for the absence of data on unemployment benefits, by calcu-
lating accumulated tenure for the subsample of those individuals with high probability of
being entrants in the labor force in their first observation in our data set (i.e., those under
25 years-old in their first observed job). Using the rules for entitlement to unemployment
benefits in Spain, we have imputed to each of these workers whether or not they are
entitled to benefits. In estimating this model, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
is rejected. Hence, we do have some confidence that our model with unobserved het-
erogeneity constitutes a proper way to control for the absence of data on unemployment
benefits.
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sample of over 19,000 individuals affiliated to Social Security.
Our principal finding on the success of THAs as a recruitment method by
client firms is, however, two-fold. On the one hand, the results of our analysis
indicate that those intermediaries are very effective in helping unemployed
find a new job, especially for short-term unemployed individuals since, for
the latter, it takes considerable less time to exit from unemployment. At
the same time, however, job tenure through those intermediaries is lower
than for the remainder of workers. Given that this form of intermediated
work implies enhanced opportunities of employment while, at the same time,
agency workers are only recruited for very short time periods, the practice
of agency hiring seems to imply a trade-off for the employee.
Apart from a comparative evaluation of THA and no-THA individuals,
several finer additional results must be pointed out from the empirical analy-
sis. Firstly, the probability of exiting from employment is negatively affected
by job tenure and is largely determined by the duration of fixed—term con-
tracts. Moreover, those with relatively low qualification levels and younger
women are more likely to become unemployed. Secondly, we find that a
long unemployment duration reduces the likelihood of finding a job, even
when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. In addition, this hazard
rate differs according to the individuals considered: middle-aged men who
have an intermediate qualification level and are at the beginning of their un-
employment spells are the most likely to re-enter employment. Thirdly, the
existence of certain employment practices are also highlighted by our results.
In particular, employers are frequently resorting to layoffs and recalls. These
are arrangements whereby workers are required to stop working for a tem-
porary period –during which unemployment benefits might be received–
and after which they are re-employed by the same firm.
Finally, in spite of the fact that turnover rates in the nineties are ex-
ceptionally high, evidence is found supporting the idea that the 1997 Gov-
ernment measures –intended to tighten regulations governing temporary
work– have had some influence on labour mobility patterns.24 Specifically,
the likelihood of exiting from employment has reduced since 1997, and is
particularly lower at the peak months when compared to the periods 1990-
1994 and 1995-1996. However, at the same time, the likelihood of exiting
from unemployment is comparatively higher from the year 1997 onwards
when compared to the first decade of the nineties, although only for very
short unemployment durations.
24Similar results are obtained in Kugler et al (2003) using the Spanish Labour Force
Survey.
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Table 1
Temporary contracts managed by THAs in Spain
Year
Temporary
contracts (1)
Temporary contracts
managed by THAs (2)
Proportion
[(2)/(1)]*100
1995 5,519,350 361,633 6.55%
1996 8,273,175 748,601 9.05%
1997 9,386,084 1,260,524 13.43%
1998 10,692,315 1,707,842 15.97%
1999 12,017,063 1,892,284 15.75%
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labor
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Table 2
Employment and unemployment duration by spells with the
same firm (in days)
Nr. SPELLS Avg. empl. duration. Avg. unempl. duration
with = firm: THA workers no-THA workers THA workers no-THA workers
0 157,30 221.93 80.60 90.25
2 116.87 147.25 74.83 98.44
3 104.61 112.91 69.42 96.25
4 83.10 106.54 66.38 92.44
5 73.08 91.48 60.16 87.74
6 56.05 76.09 68.33 75.15
7 45.84 60.14 51.61 79.40
8 39.29 55.43 52.08 82.81
9 37.90 39.92 53.45 82.13
10 39.72 50.30 59.34 68.13
11 42.82 30.05 54.40 52.90
12 33.44 41.80 43.13 50.73
Source: Social Security records and authors’ own calculations.
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Table 3
Main sample characteristics for employment duration analysis
Total Sample THA workers No-THA workers
Total % Total % Total %
Total 49,322 13,614 35,708
Censored 2,098 4.25 98 0.72 2,000 5.60
Gender: Male 30,113 61.05 7,489 55.01 22,624 63.36
Equal employer 15,759 31.95 7,177 52.72 8,582 24.03
High Qual. 1,931 3.92 336 2.47 1,595 4.47
Med.—High Qual. 5,074 10.29 1,012 7.43 4,062 11.38
Med.—Low Qual. 17,792 36.07 5,154 37.86 12,638 35.39
Low Qual. 24,525 49.72 7,112 52.24 17,413 48.76
Age 16—25 16,955 34.38 5,557 40.82 11,398 31.92
Age 26—35 20,085 40.72 4,747 34.87 15,338 42.95
Age 36—52 12,282 24.90 3,310 24.31 8,972 25.13
Duration (months)∗:
1-3 26,360 55.82 9,448 69.90 16,912 50.17
3-6 10,822 22.92 2,419 17.90 8,403 24.93
6-12 5,670 12.01 960 7.10 4,710 13.97
12-24 2,923 6.19 508 3.76 2,415 7.16
24-36 1,197 2.53 146 1.08 1,051 3.12
36-46 252 0.53 252 0.53 252 0.53
Statistics∗:
Average Duration 5.39 3.65 6.09
Median Duration 3 2 3
*Without taking into account censored observations
Source: Social Security records.
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Table 4
Main sample characteristics for unemployment duration analysis
Total Sample THA workers No-THA workers
Total % Total % Total %
Total 34,137 13,033 21,104
Censored 714 2.09 250 1.92 464 2.20
Gender: Male 18,642 54.61 6,421 49.27 12,221 57.91
Equal employer 16,994 49.78 8,432 64.70 8,562 40.57
High Qual. 1,022 2.99 81 0.62 941 4.46
Med.—High Qual. 2,987 8.75 751 5.76 2,236 10.60
Med.—Low Qual. 12,602 36.92 5,136 39.41 7,466 35.38
Low Qual. 17,526 51.34 7,065 54.21 10,461 49.57
Age 16—25 16,483 48.28 7,080 54.32 9,403 44.56
Age 26—35 11,102 32.52 3,673 28.18 7,429 35.20
Age 36—52 6,552 19.19 2,280 17.49 4,272 20.24
Duration (months)∗:
1-3 23,629 70.70 10,316 80.70 13,313 64.50
3-6 4,640 13.88 1,396 10.92 3,244 15.72
6-12 3,527 10.55 738 5.77 2,789 13.51
12-24 1,356 4.06 288 2.25 1,068 5.17
24-30 271 0.81 45 0.35 226 1.09
Statistics∗:
Average Duration 3.73 2.81 4.29
Median Duration 2 2 2
*Without taking into account censored observations
Source: Social Security records.
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Table 5
Logit Regression for Employment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Log(t) -2.0714 -27.59 -2.0835 -27.63
Log(t)2 1.8568 17.69 1.8682 17.75
Log(t)3 -.80704 -16.36 -.81238 -16.41
Log(t)4 .1100 15.23 .1111 15.31
THA .5238 33.96 .53513 31.75
Gender -.1130 -5.78 -.1126 -5.75
Gender*Log(t) .0910 8.02 .0908 7.93
High Qual. -.7432 -11.52 -.7358 -11.33
High Qual.*Log(t) .1389 5.18 .1315 4.81
Med.-High Qual. -.2531 -6.40 -.2476 -6.20
Med.-High Qual.*Log(t) -.0250 -1.39 -.0297 -1.62
Med.-Low Qual. -.0893 -4.50 -.09024 -4.48
Age 26-35 -.1165 -5.67 -.1167 -5.66
Age 26-35*Log(t) .0728 5.81 .0717 5.67
Age 36-52 .0431 1.24 .0485 1.37
Equal employer .5217 42.35 .5267 40.26
Public firm .4157 11.48 .4153 11.38
Public firm*Log(t) -.0567 -2.90 -.0544 -2.73
GDP growth rate -.0982 -10.69 -.0982 -10.65
GDP growth rate*Log(t) .0766 14.78 .0774 14.84
Unemployment rate .0211 14.18 .0211 14.12
Unempl. rate*Log(t) -.0042 -4.36 -.0039 -4.04
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Table 5 (cont.)
Logit regression for employment hazard rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Duration dependence Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Period 6 1.7613 38.83 1.7644 38.75
Period 6*GDP growth rate -0.0642 -4.49 -0.0646 -4.51
Period 6*Age 26—35 -0.1528 -3.70 -0.1527 -3.69
Period 6*Age 36-52 -0.2591 -5.37 -0.2602 -5.38
Period 6*Public Firm -0.2423 -3.81 -0.2437 -3.82
Period 12 1.5491 12.67 1.5537 12.69
Period 12*GDP growth rate -0.1206 -5.37 -0.1210 -5.38
Period 12*Unempl. rate 0.0154 3.02 0.0154 3.00
Period 12*Age 26—35 -0.3069 -4.45 -0.3073 -4.45
Period 12*Age 36—52 -0.4872 -5.55 -0.4899 -5.57
Period 12*Public Firm -0.2371 -2.09 -0.2355 -2.07
Period 18 1.7466 18.73 1.7482 18.73
Period 18*GDP growth rate -0.1007 -3.16 -0.1009 -3.16
Period 18*Age 26—35 -0.2452 -2.36 -0.3073 -4.45
Period 18*Age 36—52 -0.4057 -2.93 -0.4091 -2.95
Period 18*Public Firm -0.6004 -2.86 -0.5947 -2.83
Period 24 1.9985 10.38 1.9916 10.32
Period 24*Unempl. rate 0.0196 2.34 0.0200 2.37
Period 24*Age 26—35 -0.5578 -4.92 -0.5612 -4.94
Period 24*Age 36—52 -1.1895 -6.86 -1.1963 -6.88
Period 24*Public Firm -0.7390 -3.27 -0.7310 -3.23
Period 30 2.4294 18.97 2.4275 18.91
Period 30*GDP growth rate -0.2447 -5.42 -0.2473 -5.38
Period 30*Age 26—35 -0.6408 -4.13 -0.6468 -4.15
Period 30*Age 36—52 -0.9256 -3.99 -0.9334 -4.01
Period 30*Public Firm -0.7533 -2.19 -0.7438 -2.16
Period 36 2.5423 9.85 2.5341 9.72
Period 36*Unempl. rate 0.0542 4.89 0.0551 4.92
Period 36*Age 26—35 -0.8963 -6.14 -0.9172 -6.21
Period 36*Age 36—52 -1.1409 -5.48 -1.1613 -5.52
Period 36*Public Firm -1.9360 -5.78 -1.9311 -5.74
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Table 5 (Cont.)
Logit Regression for Employment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
period 1995-1996 .6835 13.01 .6777 12.81
* Log(t) -.1532 -10.59 -.1494 -9.80
* GDP growth rate -.0883 -4.66 -.0883 -4.63
* High Qual. -.1154 -1.75 -.1250 -1.86
* Med.- High Qual. -.1925 -4.44 -.1987 -4.49
* Med.- Low Qual. -.0806 -2.90 -.0798 -2.83
* Age 36-52 -.0710 -1.84 -.0796 -2.01
* Public firm .0667 1.56 .0764 1.74
period 1997-1999 .8307 12.27 .8361 12.28
* Log(t) -.2813 -16.99 -.2814 -16.86
* GDP growth rate -.0695 -3.66 -.0723 -3.78
* High Qual. -.0905 -1.33 -.0944 -1.37
* Med.- High Qual. -.2777 -6.11 -.2811 -6.10
* Med.- Low Qual. -.1012 -3.44 -.1016 -3.41
* Age 26-35 .0241 0.80 .0252 0.83
* Age 36-52 .0703 1.64 .0654 1.50
* Sex -.0778 -3.08 -.0779 -3.06
* Public firm .1772 4.17 .1828 4.23
Constant -1.3300 -31.36 -1.334 -31.11
Unobserved Heterogeneity:
p 0.9925 74.62
η1 0.0091 0.53
Log Likelihood -115,284.7 -115281.81
Size 311,156 311,156
Notes: Reference category is: Female, non—THA worker, Low qualifi-
cation, Age 16—25, Non-equal employer, Private Employer, Fourth Quarter,
Years 1990-94.
The coefficients for the interactions between duration dummies and
other explanatory variables are not presented for space considerations. Source:
Social Security records.
26
Table 6
Predicted Employment Average Duration for different Individual
Groups (in months)
Avg. THA no-THA 1990-94 1995-96 1997-99
Full Sample 6.35 3.50 7.14 7.19 5.63 5.72
Men
Age 16-25
Unskilled 5.43 2.51 6.32 6.06 4.62 4.80
Skilled 7.87 9.80 7.44 9.15 5.71 7.32
Age 26-35
Unskilled 6.41 2.70 7.08 6.73 5.73 6.02
Skilled 11.52 11.34 11.55 12.22 9.63 11.30
Age 36-52
Unskilled 5.31 2.67 6.04 6.54 5.16 5.06
Skilled 11.01 9.07 11.43 12.15 9.65 11.89
Women
Age 16-25
Unskilled 5.39 2.90 6.27 6.34 4.63 4.01
Skilled 7.52 8.64 7.18 8.34 5.05 8.36
Age 26-35
Unskilled 5.95 3.12 6.82 6.60 5.31 5.29
Skilled 5.93 3.14 6.95 6.64 5.34 5.32
Age 36-52
Unskilled 4.31 2.51 5.21 6.49 4.69 3.32
Skilled 8.81 8.50 8.91 9.99 8.48 8.68
Source: Social Security records.
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Table 7
Logit Regression for Unemployment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Log(t) 2.2687 24.93 2.6735 20.78
Log(t)2 -3.4392 -23.49 -3.4868 -22.37
Log(t)3 1.5429 20.10 1.5234 19.04
Log(t)4 -.2265 -18.05 -.2222 -17.13
THA .6550 14.53 .7492 13.66
THA*Log(t) -.3259 -17.40 -.3559 -16.91
Gender .1062 4.723 .1256 4.84
Gender*Log(t) -.0269 -1.80 -.0327 -2.06
High Qual. .0381 0.937 .0491 1.08
Med.-High Qual. .0145 0.481 .0158 0.47
Med.-Low Qual. .1550 6.06 .1712 5.84
Age 26-35 .4949 15.67 .5652 14.55
Age 26-35*Log(t) -.0794 -4.58 -.0918 -4.89
Age 36-52 .4581 8.27 .5213 8.12
Age 36-52*Log(t) -.1558 -6.87 -.1682 -6.96
Employment Duration .0153 7.08 .0174 7.04
Empl. Durac*Log(t) -.0069 -4.85 -.0073 -4.84
Equal Employer .8726 51.03 .9845 32.84
Public firm -.4214 -9.546 -.4969 -9.36
Public firm*Log(t) .0840 3.206 .0964 3.41
Unemployment rate -.0194 -6.25 -.0210 -5.93
GDP growth rate .0497 4.16 .0610 4.38
GDP growth rate*Log(t) .0172 2.19 .0162 1.93
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Table 7 (cont.)
Logit Regression for Unemployment Hazard Rate
Without Unobs. Heter. With Unobs. Heter.
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
period 1995-1996 1.2126 12.23 1.4379 12.01
* Log(t) .1334 5.51 .1259 4.77
* THA -.3907 -8.03 -.4448 -8.02
* Age 26-35 -.3235 -9.02 -.3636 -8.90
* Age 36-52 -.2438 -4.10 -.2740 -4.08
* Med-High Qual. -.0707 -1.40 -.0705 -1.26
* Med-Low Qual. -.0744 -2.19 -.0745 -1.96
* Empl. Durat. -.0003 -4.33 -.0004 -4.37
* GDP growth rate -.1186 -4.92 -.1584 -5.63
* Unemploym. rate -.0114 -3.75 -.0130 -3.79
period 1997-1999 2.0714 18.97 2.3310 17.79
* Log(t) -.2171 -8.07 -.2540 -8.42
* THA -.1350 -2.64 -.1515 -2.66
* Gender .1634 5.27 .1725 5.06
* Age 26-35 -.5220 -12.83 -.5796 -12.54
* Age 36-52 -.4356 -7.21 -.4840 -7.09
* Med-Low Qual. -.0744 -2.04 -.0861 -2.12
* Public Firm .1413 2.79 .1696 3.00
* Equal Employer -.2485 -7.76 -.2908 -8.04
* Unemploym. rate -.0215 -7.10 -.0235 -6.90
* GDP growth rate -.2368 -8.31 -.2620 -8.36
Constant -1.7098 -24.41 -1.9427 -20.74
Unobserved Heterogeneity:
η1 1.3610 10.04
p 0.2256 5.57
Log Likelihood -69,211.994 -69,203.179
Size 146,071 146,071
Notes: Reference category is: Female, non—THA worker,
Low qualification, Age 16—25, Non-equal employer, Madrid, Fourth quarter.
Source: Social Security records.
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Table 8
Predicted Unemployment Average Duration for different
Individual Groups (in months)
Avg. THA no-THA 1990-94 1995-96 1997-99
Full Sample 3.08 2.72 3.21 4.97 2.31 2.06
Men
Age 16-25
Unskilled 3.69 2.89 3.99 6.27 2.37 1.79
Skilled 4.73 6.27 4.53 8.38 1.57 3.06
Age 26-35
Unskilled 2.51 2.13 2.64 3.02 2.13 2.21
Skilled 3.12 2.96 3.14 4.24 1.94 2.46
Age 36-52
Unskilled 2.41 2.51 2.37 4.05 1.97 2.46
Skilled 8.09 11.32 6.88 7.67 7.23 8.63
Women
Age 16-25
Unskilled 3.43 3.20 3.53 6.07 2.19 1.74
Skilled 4.45 4.34 4.45 6.91 2.05 2.78
Age 26-35
Unskilled 3.21 3.07 3.26 4.17 2.88 2.79
Skilled 3.29 3.35 3.27 4.17 3.01 2.38
Age 36-52
Unskilled 2.92 2.76 3.03 4.05 2.65 2.85
Skilled 5.34 5.99 5.04 6.81 3.62 6.22
Source: Social Security records.
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Employment Hazard Rate
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Figure 2: Employment Hazard Rates for THA and no-THA workers
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Unemployment Hazard Rate
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Figure 4: Unemployment Hazard Rate for THA and no-THA workers
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Figure 5: Unemployment Hazard Rate in three different periods
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
1990-1994
1995-1996
1997-1999
Figure 6: Unemployment Hazard Rates: the effect of unobserved heterogeneity
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